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ARTHUR A. JONES, Appellant, v. LOUISE B. :MARTIN
et al., Defendants; ISABELLE WELLINS, as Administratrix etc. et al., Respondents.
[1] Attorneys-Compensation-Contracts for Contingent FeesEffect of Discharge.-An attorney employed under a contingent fee agreement who is wrongfully discharged by his client
is generally entitled to the same amount of compensation and
under the same contingency as if he had completed the services contemplated.
[2] !d.-Compensation-Contracts for Contingent Fees-Equitable
Interest.-A contingent fee agreement vests the attorney with,...
an equitable interest in that part of the client's cause of action
which is agreed on as the contingent fee.
[3] Id.-Compensation-Lien.--An attorney under a contingent
fee agreement has no special or charging lien, unless it has
been specifically contracted for.
[4] Assignments-Rights and Liabilities of Parties.-A debtor will
not be discharged from his obligations by performance rendered to the assignor after notice of assignment.
[5a, 5b] Attorneys-Compensation-Lien-Waiver or EstoppeLAn attorney who was retained under a contingent fee contract
which operated as an assignment pro tanto to him of anything
collected on the client's claim, and who was discharged without
cause by client before settlement of claim, waived or was
estopped to assert any lien or equitable interest he might have
had to sums collected on settlement of claim, and the obligation secured by such lien was lost, where he stated in affidavits
executed by him for purpose of attaching such funds that he
had no lien, and where he orally agreed with the debtor's attorney that the latter would notify him when the debtor had
paid any judgment or compromise of the action, and did not
object, on receiving such notification, that the payment was
made to his client or assignor instead of to him.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 197; Am.Jur., Attorneys
at Law, § 163 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law,§ 192; Am.Jur., Attorneys
at Law, § 163 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 104; [2] Attorneys,
§ 102; [3, 5] Attorneys, § 96; [ 4] Assignment, § 62; [ 6] Liens, § 19;
[7] Appeal and Error, § 1521; [8] Decedents' Estates, § 481.

24

JONES

v.

MARTIN

[41 C.2d

[6] Liens-Waiver or EstoppeL-Waiver of or estoppel to assert
a lien or an equitable interest in property does not necessarily
mean that the obligation secured by the lien or giving rise to
the interest is lost, for it may exist without the security or
other assurance that it will be discharged.
[7] Appeal-Harmless Error- Pleading- Variance and Proof.Plaintiff's claim that estoppel or waiver was not properly
pleaded because it was alleged in defendant's answer that the
agreement in question was made when a substitution of attorneys was filed rather than some two years later, as found
by the court, is not prejudicial to plaintiff where he was advised of the situation he had to meet and the seeming variances
as to times was not vital.
[8] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Presentation-Attorney's Fees.An attorney who was retained under a contingent fee contract
which operated as an assignment pro tanto to him of anything
collected on the client's claim, and who was discharged without cause by client before settlement of claim, cannot maintain
an action for such fees against administratrix of estate of attorney who succeeded him and who effectuated a settlement
of such claim, where no claim for such fees was filed against
that estate (Prob. Code, §§ 707, 709); and he cannot escape
such claim requirement by asserting a constructive trust
against the deceased attorney, where he has waived or is
estopped from asserting any equitable interest in property of
estate by failing to include decedent as a named party in his
original complaint, by asserting that he was entitled to half
the recovery under his contingent fee contract, and by attaching decedent's bank account, thereby indicating reliance
on a contract debt rather than a claim to specific property as
the beneficiary of a constructive trust.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to recover attorney's fees. Judgment for defendants
affirmed.
Arthur A. Jones, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Belli, Ashe & Pinney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Macbeth & Ford, Vincent J. Blumberg, Patrick H. Ford and
David Sokol for Respondents.
[8] See Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators,§§ 500, 505, 509;
Am.Jur., ;Executors and Administrators, § 348 et seq.
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GARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendants, except Mrs. Martin, in an action to recover attorney's fees. Defendants in the original complaint were
Mrs. Martin, a labor union-an unincorporated association,
and some of the members thereof. By amended complaint,
\711 ellins, an attorney at law, was added as a defendant. Later
he died and Isabelle W ellins, as the administratrix of his
estate, was substituted.
According to the findings (the case was tried by the court
without a jury) plaintiff, an attorney at law, was employed
by Mrs. Martin by written contract to represent her in prosecuting a claim against the union for personal injuries arising
out of an assault and battery, under which contract he was to
receive a contingent fee of 50 per cent of all sums recovered
on the elaim by action, compromise or otherwise. It was also
agreed that plaintiff was to have full charge of the collection
of the claim; that a discharge of plaintiff would not affect his
right or interest in the claim and a recovery thereon; that the
agreement operates as an assignment and transfer pro tanto
to plaintiff of the claim and right to recover and anything
collected thereon. Plaintiff commenced an action on the
claim but before it was tried, and on April1, 1949, defendant,
Mrs. Martin, without just cause, discharged plaintiff as her
attorney and had defendant Wellins substituted in his place.
The action was tried by W ellins and judgment obtained on
November 8, 1950, in favor of Mrs. Martin for $24,126.29.
While that action was pending and before judgment, plaintiff
commenced the instant action on September 25, 1950, in which
vVellins was not a party defendant. The complaint was entitled one for money due, and alleged that a judgment had
been obtained (apparently, however, it had not yet been
entered at that time) ; that plaintiff was entitled to one-half
the judgment under the contract; that the judgment debtors
were willing to pay and are indebted to plaintiff and should
be enjoined from paying to Mrs. Martin; and that plaintiff,
by reason of his contract, had a lien on the judgment for onehalf thereof. The amended complaint filed in May, 1951,
made Well ins a party and charged him with having received
and paid out in part, the $20,000 which was received in
settlement of the judgment, knowing of plaintiff's claim and
lien, and that he held the $20,000 as constructive trustee for
plaintiff. vVellins knew of the pendency of this action on or
about November 15, 1950, and of plaintiff's contract at all
times since April 8, 1949. The union also knew of the con-
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tract at all times since April 18, 1949, and there had been
served upon them a written notice of lien on April 27, 1949.
On August 16, 1950, plaintiff orally agreed with David Sokol,
the union's attorney, that Sokol would notify plaintiff when
the union had paid the judgment or a compromise of the action
and plaintiff would then attempt to attach the money. The
action was settled for $20,000 on April 16, 1951, by check to
Mrs. Martin and Wellins. On April 17, 1951, Wellins deposited the check to his account and paid $4,000 to the union's
workmen's compensation insurance carrier and $8,000 to himself as attorney's fees. On April 20, 1951, he paid the balance
of $8,000 to Mrs. Martin and she left the state. Sokol telephoned plaintiff's office on April16, 1951, to notify him of the
settlement but was unable to contact him. He did notify him
on April 17, 1951, at which time plaintiff made no protest or
objection to the payment of the settlement amount, or claim
that it violated his rights and did not assert any claim of lien.
On September 25, 1950, plaintiff filed in the instant action
an affidavit for attachment which stated that the union and
Mrs. Martin were indebted to him for $12,063.15, on contract
and the payment has not been secured by a lien or mortgage
on personal property. The sheriff was instructed to levy on
the judgment. On April 21, 1951, plaintiff again executed an
affidavit for attachment, stating that defendants in the instant
action were indebted to him on contract for $10,000 and that
its payment is not secured by any lien upon personal property.
The attachment was levied on \Vellins' bank account and was
not discharged until W ellins' death on June 15, 1951. On
April 23, 1951, Wellins told plaintiff of the disbursement
of the settlement money as above described. W ellins died on
June 15, 1951, and his administratrix was substituted in his
place.
Finally it was concluded that plaintiff had waived his claim
for an attorney fee lien and defendants ceased to be constructive trustees of the fund upon the waiver; that plaintiff
had filed no claim against the estate of Wellins pursuant to
§ 707 of the Probate Code and hence his action was premature.
It was also concluded that plaintiff have judgment for
$8,000 against Mrs. Martin bjlt that plaintiff waived his attorney lien as to the other defendants and is estopped to assert
any lien; that plaintiff take nothing as to those defendants.
Judgment was accordingly entered.
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l'laintiff nontrmr1s that evPn if he lost his "attorney's lien"
he did not lose his cause of' action against the union or W ellins,
such cause of action being based upon payment by the debtor,
the union, to the assignor Mrs. Martin, after notice to the
debtor of the pro tanto assignment by Mrs. Martin to plaintiff
of whatever was recovered on her claim for damages against
the union; that vV ellins, and later his administratrix, held
the money received from the union as constructive trustee
because he had received it with knowledge of plaintiff's claim
under his attorney's fee contract; that there was no estoppel
or waiver of either his lien, his cause of action, or right to
assert a constructive trust; that because there was a cont>tructive trust it was not necessary to file a claim against
W ellins' estate under section 707 of the Probate Code.
There is no question that the union and W ellins were fully
advised of plaintiff's contract with Mrs. Martin and any
rights he had thereunder and the court so found. No question is raised as to the validity of the ''assignment'' features of
that contract or that a lien could have been thereby created.
'l'he contract was not unconscionable and plaintiff was discharged without cause. [1] An attorney employed under
a contingent fee agreement who is wrongfully discharged by
his client, is generally entitled to the same amount of compensation and under the same contingency as if he had completed the services contemplated. (Salopek v. Schoemarnn,
20 Cal.2d 150 [124 P.2d 21] ; Zur1:ch G. A. & L. Ins. Co.,
Ltd. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal.2d 98 [81 P.2d 913] ; Denio v. City
of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal.2d 580 [140 P.2d 392, 149 A.L.R.
320]; see cases eollected 6 Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law,
§ 197.) [2] And "A contingent fee agreement vests the
attorney with an equitable interest in that part of the client's
cause of action which is agreed upon as the contingent fee.
'l'his proposition may be given practical effeet by the imposition of a constructive trust for the protection of the attorney's
equitable interest, by acknowledging the existence of an express trust created by the contingent fee agreement in favor of
the attorney, or by ruling that neither the client nor the
opposite party, if the latter has knowledge of the attorney's
rights under the contingent fee agreement, can so compromise
the litigated subject matter as to defeat the attorney's rights.
. . . [3] However, an attorney under a contingent fee agreement has no special or charging lien, unless it has been
specifically contracted for." ( 6 Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law,
§ 192.) [ 4] It is also true that a debtor will not be dis-
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charged from his obligations by performance rendered to the
assignor after notice of the assignment. (McCarthy v. Mt.
Tecarte L. & W. Co., 110 Cal. 687 [43 P. 391]; Greenlee v.
Los Angeles Tntst etc. Bank, 171 Cal. 371 [153 P. 383] ;
H. D. Roosen Co. v. Pac'ific Radio Pub. Co., 123 Cal.App. 525
[11 P.2d 873]; Gmham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, 124 Cal. 117
[56 P. 627, 71 Am.St.Rep. 26, 44 L.R.A. 632]; Nelson v. Fernando Nelson & Sons, 5 Cal.2d 511 [55 P.2d 859], Rest. Contracts, § 170.)
It would appear, therefore, under the foregoing rules that
neither the union nor vV ellins could pay the money recovered
to Mrs. Martin and be relieved of the obligation under the
assignment, or "equitable interest," "lien" or constructive
trust unless plaintiff waived or was estopped to assert such
rights, as was found by the court.
[5a] In regard to the union it is clear that plaintiff
waived or is estopped to assert any "lien" or "equitable interest.'' \V e have the two attachment affidavits in which it
was asserted under oath by plaintiff that he had no lienthat the payment of his claim for attorney's fees was not
secured by any ''lien.'' That may well be interpreted to include any equitable interest. There is also.the oral agreement
of August 16, 1950, between Sokol, the union's attorney, and
plaintiff, found by the. court, that "Sokol would notify said
plaintiff . . . when his clients, the said . . . [Union] had
paid any judgment or compromise of said action . . . and that
said plaintiff . . . would then try to attach the money by
proceeding in this then pending action . . . '' from which it is
implicit that plaintiff was not only not insisting on his right
to a lien-equitable interest but was also waiving any objection he had to the payment to his assignor instead of to him.
[6] The waiver of or estoppel to assert a lien or an equitable
interest in property does not necessarily mean that the obligation secured by the lien or giving rise to the interest is lost,
as it may exist without the security or other assurance that
it will be discharged. [5b] But here the court was justified
in concluding that not only the lien and equitable interest
were lost, but also the obligation, because, implicit in the oral
agreement is an authorization by plaintiff (assignee) that the
union (debtor) could pay the assignor (Mrs. Martin) rather
than him. Subsequent to the agreement, and on April 16,
1951, Sokol paid to Mrs. .Martin and W ellins the $20,000
settlement, after trying unsuccessfully, but without fault on
his part, to notify plaintiff thereof. He notified him on April
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17, 1951, and the court found that "At said time of said
notice said plaintiff made no protest or objection to said payment, made no claim that it violated any of his rights, and
made no assertion of any right to a lien on the fund before
said payment.''
Plaintiff makes numerous claims with respect to the foregoing, such as asserted negligence and fraud on Sokol's part,
no justified reliance on the oral agreement, and further that
his action (the instant one) commenced in September, 1950,
after the oral agreement, charging the nnion with responsibility, prevented reliance on the agreement by the union. The
whole course of events and conduct of plaintiff subsequent to
the commencement of his action, and thereafter, showed that
he was not relying upon a claim against the union. These
events, supported by adequate evidence, are summarized by
the trial court in its memorandum opinion as follows: ''The
minute order for judgment in the Schneiderman case [the
personal injury action] was made on August 15, 1950. On
the next day Mr. Sokol, attorney for the Union defendants,
wrote plaintiff saying 'It is very urgent that you get in touch
with me and I shall appreciate hearing from you.' (Exhibit B.)
Mr. Sokol previously had been notified in writing of plaintiff's
claim of an attorney's lien. Shortly after receipt of this
letter plaintiff called at Mr. Sokol's home and was told that
the latter was at a loss to know what his, plaintiff's, rights
were against Sokol's clients, that he knew of no right to a lien
against them and that he would like to know what plaintiff
wanted him to do. Thereupon plaintiff said that all he would
ask of Mr. Sokol was to notify him when the defendants had
paid the judgment and that he would try to attach. This is
all he asked Mr. Sokol to do. ·when the judgment was entered,
Mr. Sokol promptly notified plaintiff of that fact. Thereupon an appeal was taken, followed ultimately by a compromise in April, 1951. The . . . Union sent its $20,000
check to Mr. Sokol who received it on April 16, 1951. He
railed plaintiff that same day and before contacting Mr.
W ellins concerning receipt of the check. Being unable to
reach plaintiff, he told Mr. Alperin, his office associate, that
if Mr. Jones should call, to tell him of the fact of the receipt
of the money to close the settlement of the judgment. But
lVIr. \V ellins was pressing him for a consummation of the compromise and so on that same day the $20,000 was paid to him
by Mr. Sokol. On the 17th Sokol reached plaintiff by telephone and plaintiff said that his secretary had not been in
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the office on the 16th. He also said that he would attempt
to attach or restrain the payment of the money by W ellins.
Mr. Sokol heard no more from Mr. Jones until on the 25th
of April. In the meantime the alias writ of attachment was
issued on the 23d, based upon plaintiff's affidavit of the 21st.
Although this writ was not levied on any property of the
union defendants, Mr. Sokol was curious and on the 25th
called on Mr. Jones, asking him why he was keeping his,
Sokol's clients in the case, asserting that no attorney's lien
could run against them,-a position he still maintains and in
apparent good faith. Plaintiff said he did not know, but he
thought he might have something. The significance of this
conversation of the 25th,-after the money had been paid over
to \V ellins,-is that it shows plaintiff had little confidence in
his lien and was relying upon other remedies, such as injunction and attachment. J_jater, when Mr. Sokol reproached him
for inserting in the amended complaint herein an allegation
that he, Sokol, had promised to deposit the money in court,
Mr. Jones replied that he had to put something in there. In
fact, plaintiff never made any such request and Mr. Sokol
made no such promise. He fully performed his promise to
plaintiff both in letter and in spirit. It is apparent from
the foregoing that the court accepts on all points of conflict
the testimony of Mr. Sokol rather than that of Mr. Jones,
whose credibility has been destroyed in divers ways and respects. The charges of unethical conduct which were hurled
at Mr. Sokol by Mr. Jones from the witness stand are untrue.
"Plaintiff's conduct justifiably led Mr. Sokol to believe
that he did not and would not stand upon his claim of a
lien. The union defendants have changed their position to
their prejudice in reliance upon plaintiff's conduct and he is
estopped now to insist upon the lien against them. . . . ''
Plaintiff's main argument on this point (waiver of lien)
seems to center around the alleged incredibility of the union's
witness Sokol. That was a question for the trial court which
was resolved against plaintiff and it was justified in drawing
reasonable inferences which established a waiver or estoppel
rather than those to the contrary.
It is urged that estoppel or waiver cannot apply because
there was no misleading conduct or statements by plaintiff as
to present facts-only future promises were made. As seen
from the oral agreement and other conduct of plaintiff, there
was a present intent to abandon the claim against the union.
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[7] Plaintiff claims that the estoppel or waiver was not
properly pleadAd because it was alleged in the union's answer
that the agreement was made when the substitution of attorneys was filed rather than in August, 1951, as found by
the court. It was alleged in the answer that at the time of
the substitution plaintiff told Sokol there was nothing he could
do ''until any money recovered by the plaintiff . . . was paid
by these defendants and that plaintiff would appreciate it if
David Sokol would advise plaintiff when the matter came to
trial and when judgment was entered''; that thereafter at
various times Sokol communicated with plaintiff, and after
entry of the judgment in the personal injury action plaintiff
again said that all he expected of Sokol was to advise plaintiff
when payment was made, and there was nothing else Sokol
could do, and plaintiff could do nothing as to the payment
until payment had been made. The court found the oral
agreement as above mentioned and that the allegations of the
answer were true except that it is not true that plaintiff's
request to Sokol to keep plaintiff posted was made at the time
of substitution, or that plaintiff said Sokol could do nothing
until payment, or that Sokol's discussion concerning what
action plaintiff wanted from Sokol was shortly after the entry
of the judgment or by telephone. But it is true that ''plaintiff
in said discussion did state that all he wanted said Sokol to
do in plaintiff's behalf was to advise plaintiff when payment
had been made to defendant Louise Martin or her attorney,
Marvin W ellins; and it is not true that plaintiff advised said
Sokol that there was nothing else that said Sokol could do,
but it is true that plaintiff did advise said Sokol, shortly after
August 15, 1950, that there was nothing else said Sokol should
do as far as plaintiff's rights were concerned; and it is not
true that plaintiff at said time stated to said Sokol that under
the law plaintiff could take no action whatsoever until said
Sokol or the defendants he represented had paid over the
moneys pursuant to the judgment to said Louise Martin.''
We do not believe that plaintiff was prejudiced. He was
advised of the situation he had to meet and the seeming
variances as to times was not vital. Indeed, plaintiff admitted
the conversation in regard to the agreement:
'' Q. BY MR. SoKoL: Didn't you tell me in my home when
I asked you what I could do, that the only thing-you told me
'Sokol, when you pay the money, let me know and then I
will attach it.' Did you or did you not tell me that, in my
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home~ A. That was part of the conversation, but not all of it.
You are leaving out other parts that are very important."
[8] In regard to W ellins it appears that recovery against
his administratrix was properly denied because of plaintiff's
failure to file a claim against the estate. Section 707 of the
Probate Code provides that all claims arising upon contract
must be filed or presented within the time required or they
are barred. Likewise a claim must be presented or filed
where, as here, an action against decedent involving the claim
is pending at the time of his death and no recovery may be
had unless there is proof of the filing or presentment of a
claim. (Prob. Code, § 709.) Here plaintiff did not present or
file any claim.
He endeavors to escape the claim requirement by asserting
that none is required where he is, as here, asserting a constructive trust against \:Vellins, decedent. (See llA Cal.Jur.
706-707, 711-712.) The theory is that by reason of the trust
the beneficiary has an interest in specific property included
in the assets of the estate-a claim that such interest belongs
to him, not to the estate, as distinguished from a debt or
obligation arising out of contract.
That argument will not aid plaintiff because he has waived
or is estopped from asserting any equitable interest in any
property of W ellins' estate by the following: In his original
complaint he did not even include W ellins as a named party,
and while he mentioned a lien he asserted that he was entitled
to half the recovery under his contingent :fee contract, and
that the whole is due and owing, and that defendants are indebted to plaintiff under said contract. In his amended complaint filed on May 24, 1951, when he named W ellins as a
defendant, he does allege that Wellins held the $20,000 proceeds of the settlement as constructive trustee, and he also
alleged that W ellins was indebted to him in the sum of
$10,000. In his first affidavit for attachment on the original
complaint, he asserted that defendants (union and members)
were indebted to him on a contract for the direct payment of
money and it was not secured by any lien. The same statements were made in his second affidavit for attachment which
was filed on April 23, 1951, and an attachment was issued
and levied. on W ellins' bank account and not released until
after Wellins died on June 15, 1951. We think, from the
foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff had lost any claim to an
interest in any property of W ellins' estate, and when the
latter died, plaintiff's only claim was for money arising from
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contract, and hence required the presentment or filing of a
claim. In Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal.2d 713 [221 P.2d 9], the
complaint had counts on contract and tort involving the same
transaction. Plaintiff attached and it was held that he was
estopped to rely upon the action in tort. Similarly, here
plaintiff attached the bank account of Wellins indicating
reliance upon a contract debt rather than a claim to specific
property as the beneficiary of a constructive trust.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4,
1953.

[L. A. No. 22537.
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NAOMI S. TALLEY et al., Appellants, v. NORTHERN SAN
DIEGO COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Pleading-Admissions.-For purpose of testing a question of
law, all facts well pleaded are admitted.
[2] Id.-Pacts Judicially Noticed.-Facts of which judicial notice
may be taken will be considered by court, although not pleaded,
for purpose of testing a question of law.
[3] State of California-Actions Against.-When acting in its
governmental capacity a sovereign may not be sued, except
where the doctrine has been specifically departed from by constitutional or statutory law.
[4] Id.-Tort Liability.-Doctrine of sovereign nonliability for
tort applies to state subdivisions only where they are acting in
a governmental capacity in discharge of official duties.
[5] Id.-Tort Liability.-Where the state engages in industrial or
business enterprises, as distinguished from purely governmental
activities, tort liability attaches and may be adjudicated pursuant to the consent statute. (Gov. Code, § 16041.)
[3] See· Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
States, Territories and Dependencies, § 91 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 138; [2] Pleading, § 13;
[3, 15] State of California, § 67; [4, 5] State of California, § 57;
[6] Hospitals, §1; (7-10] Hospitals, §8; (11-14] Hospitals, §5.1.
41 C.2d-.2

